2008 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

8-12-2008

Chen v. Atty Gen USA

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008

Recommended Citation
"Chen v. Atty Gen USA" (2008). 2008 Decisions. 671.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/671

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3743
___________
QI LIANG CHEN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A79-303-422)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Donald V. Ferlise

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 6, 2008
Before: RENDELL, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 12, 2008)

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM
Qi Liang Chen, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a final
order from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). For the following reasons, we
will deny the petition for review.

I.
Chen applied for asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”),1 and voluntary departure on March 28, 2001, claiming that his
wife (who remains in China) was forced to abort their second child in August 2000
pursuant to China’s coercive family planning policy. Chen testified that he was “hit hard
emotionally” after the abortion and that he left China in September 2000 with the help of
a smuggler. He claimed that he entered the United States without inspection in November
2000, and believes that he will be arrested if he returns to China because he once helped
his wife escape from the birth control office, and because he did not report to the police
after he was issued a notice to appear in July 2000.
At Chen’s removal proceedings, Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Donald Ferlise
determined, among other things, that Chen could not prove that his asylum application
was timely because he could not establish when he entered the United States. The IJ also
determined that Chen’s application was frivolous and that he was not credible. Even if he
was, the IJ stated that Chen would no longer have a well-founded fear of persecution
because there had been a fundamental change in circumstances “insofar as [his] wife has
been aborted, they only have one child and [Chen] presented absolutely no evidence that
they wish to sterilize his wife.”

1

United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, implemented in
the United States by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231.
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The BIA affirmed in September 2003, finding that the IJ correctly determined that
the application was time barred and that no exceptions to the statute of limitation applied.
The BIA did, however, reverse the frivolousness finding, and found that the IJ incorrectly
determined that there had been a fundamental change in circumstances. Then, on May
21, 2004, after granting Chen’s motion to reconsider, the BIA again dismissed his appeal.
Three years later, on April 30, 2007, Chen filed a motion to reopen, arguing that it
was not subject to the ninety-day time limitation due to exceptional circumstances. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Chen claimed that the IJ violated his due process rights by
refusing to reschedule his hearing when he had been in the emergency room until 4 a.m.
with an illness. Chen claimed that the had IJ treated him disrespectfully, and as evidence
of changed circumstances, submitted two of this Court’s opinions regarding Judge
Ferlise. Chen also submitted affidavits from himself and his wife, an abortion certificate,
and the U.S. Department of State’s 2006 country condition report on China.
The BIA dismissed the motion to reopen as untimely and determined that Chen
was not eligible for an exception to the statute of limitation based on changed
circumstances. The BIA found that Chen failed to demonstrate that the affidavits and
abortion certificates could not have been presented at the prior hearing, and that even if
the information had been previously unavailable, it merely reiterated Chen’s claim that
his wife had an abortion. The BIA also found that Chen had not established a due process
violation by presenting only a hospital bill from an emergency room. Finally, the BIA
determined that there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant a discretionary sua
3

sponte reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).
Through counsel, Chen seeks review in this Court of the BIA’s denial of his
motion to reopen.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and review the order for an
abuse of discretion. Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002). Under this
standard, the BIA’s decision will be reversed only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary
to law.” Id.
The BIA denied the motion to reopen because it was untimely and because Chen
did not meet the exception for changed circumstances under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). This
decision is not an abuse of discretion. The motion was indisputably untimely, as it was
filed over three years after the BIA denied Chen’s motion for reconsideration. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2 (c)(2) (motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order).
Chen did not contest the tardiness of his motion; he did, however, assert that it fell within
the exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), which permits reopening “based on changed
circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and
was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous
hearing.”2

2

Chen’s petition for review also asserts that his motion to reopen should have been
considered because his “new evidence” demonstrated changed circumstances in the
United States. Apart from the fact that we are unable to discern what he considers to be
changed country conditions in the United States, the regulation to which he cites governs
4

Chen offered the following documents to the BIA that he claimed were newly
discovered and previously unavailable: (1) an affidavit from himself; (2) an affidavit from
his wife; (3) a certificate stating that his wife had an abortion on August 5, 2000; (4)
copies of Cham v. Attorney General, 445 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2006), and Shah v. Attorney
General, 446 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2006); and (5) the U.S. Department of State’s 2006
country condition report for China. Apart from the country condition report, Chen’s
“new evidence” did not provide any evidence of conditions in China, but rather were
documents which if true, buttressed his own credibility. This is not a basis for reopening
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The
critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner
who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of
persecution.”).
The BIA did not discuss the 2006 country condition report, which was of course
not available at the 2002 hearing. However, it is unclear how the report would constitute
material evidence to justify reopening the proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.(c)(3)(ii)
(allowing for reopening only if new evidence is material). The report details China’s
poor human rights record, states that the family planning policies “retained harshly
coercive elements in law and practice,” and that officials in the Fujian province (where
Chen is from) “reportedly forcibly sterilized women.” Chen, however, does not claim to

exceptions to the one-year statute of limitation for filing asylum applications, not motions
to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
5

fear future persecution based on the possibility of sterilization, did not make any
arguments before the BIA—and does not make any arguments now—as to how the report
constitutes material evidence. In his motion to reopen and affidavit he repeatedly states
that he fears persecution, but does not explain why. The BIA thus did not abuse its
discretion by declining to find that the new country condition report warranted reopening.
The BIA also held that Chen failed to establish that reopening was warranted
under the Due Process Clause. At a minimum, due process requires the right to “be heard
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542,
549 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). In the immigration context, “due process
requires that aliens threatened with deportation are provided the right to a full and fair
hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf.”
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595-96 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted).
Chen claimed that his due process rights were violated when the IJ refused to reschedule
his hearing after he had been in the emergency room the previous night. Chen claimed
his testimony was detrimentally affected, due to his weakened state, by the IJ’s failure to
reschedule. In support of this claim, Chen submitted a hospital bill from the University of
Pennsylvania Medical Center dated March 6, 2002 (his hearing was on March 7th).
The BIA properly found that the hospital bill was insufficient to demonstrate a due
process violation, and explained that the record did not indicate that Chen submitted a
letter from his doctor stating that he could not testify. While illness could no doubt
adversely affect the right to be heard in a “meaningful manner,” the hospital bill does not
6

identify why Chen went to the ER, his diagnosis, or what time he was examined. The
description of services states merely “ER W Expand.” In addition to the fact that the bill
would likely have been available at the time of his hearing and does not constitute “new”
evidence, the BIA certainly did not abuse its discretion in finding that the hospital bill in
and of itself did not establish that the IJ violated Chen’s rights to due process by failing to
reschedule the hearing.
Chen also asserted that he was “bullied” and mistreated by Judge Ferlise. Chen’s
due process claim, however, was premised on the IJ’s failure to reschedule the
hearing—he did not claim that his due process rights were violated because the IJ was not
“neutral and impartial.” Even if his assertions regarding bullying and mistreatment were
viewed as a due process claim, the BIA would not have abused its discretion in declining
to reopen the proceedings. Chen submitted this Court’s opinions in Cham v. Attorney
General, 445 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2006), and Shah v. Attorney General, 446 F.3d 429 (3d
Cir. 2006), as “new evidence” of Judge Ferlise’s “bullying.” While the opinions may
demonstrate that Judge Ferlise violated other petitioners’ due process rights, they do not
constitute evidence of a due process violation in Chen’s proceedings.3

3

The record reveals that the IJ expressed impatience and was condescending toward
Chen, but his behavior does not appear to rise to the level of intemperance, hostility,
unfounded speculation, or apparent partiality that this Court has condemned in Cham and
Shah. See Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 597 (noting that the IJ’s language reflected
annoyance and dissatisfaction, “such a lack of courtesy and the absence of
professionalism do not rise . . . to a violation of due process”).
7

Finally, we do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that there
were no “exceptional circumstances” that would allow it to sua sponte reopen the
proceedings. See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2003).
For these reasons, and after careful consideration of the record and the parties’
contentions, we will deny the petition for review.
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